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CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY, TA)S, AND UNCERTAINTY: AN INTEGRATION
Summary
In this paper, we present a simple general equilibrium model of the
portfolio behavior of households and institutions, paying particular atten-
tion to the influence of differences in taxrates and attitudes toward risk.
Under the Dlausible assumptions that households are more risk averse than
institutions and possess a greater relative "tax preference" for equity
versusdebt, we are able to characterize theequilibriawhichmay result
whendebt is subject to ban).iptcy risk.
Among the issues whichwestudy are the effects of taxratechanges,
changes in risk, andchangesin firmleverageon the relative asset holdings
of the twotypesof investor andtherates of returnearmedon equityand
debt.Numerical sinu.ilations provide additionalunderstandingofthe
model' s characteristics.
Alan J.Auerbach










The relationship between the ownership of corporate securities (both
debt and equity) and the financial policy of the company is complex, and causa-
tion runs in both directions. Given the tax rates paid by its shareholders,
the firm will be able to calculate the optimal financial policy, and given the
policy of the firm, market equilibrium will determine a certain pattern of
shareholdings. To analyze how alternative tax systems will affect portfolio
decisions of both firms and investors, we need to solve the complete general
equilibrium model. A further reason for wishing to look at the general equili-
brium is that, provided the conditions necessary for the Modigliani-Miller
theorem to hold are satisfied, although the debt-equity ratio of an individual
firm may be a matter of indifference, there may exist an equilibriumaggregate
debt-equity ratio for the corporate sector as a whole.
Most work on taxation and share ownership has assumed that investorspay a
common tax rate on each form of income. If we extend this to a world in which
investors pay different marginal tax rates then, under perfect certainty, we
obtain an equilibrium with investors specializing in those securities whichare
1
optimal, given their tax rates.Mixed portfolios requires, in general, the
existence of uncertainty. We wish to focus on a model in which investors face
different tax rates but still hold diversified portfolios. To do this, we
need a model which allows for both taxes and uncertainty.
In this paper, we describe and analyze a simple general equilibrium model
with taxes and uncertainty. The rate of return on capital is random, and we
wish to know how the claims on the return will be divided between debt andequity.
The equilibrium will be characterized by the interest rate offered oncorporate
debt, the debt-equity ratio, and the relative holdings of debt and equity by
different investors.2
The usual portfolio approach to investor behavior, which utilizes the capital
Asset Pricing Model2, cannot be applied directly here because the variances and
covariances of securities are endogenous to the model. Furthermore, the possi-
bility of bankruptcy means that the model is rather difficult to handle mathemati-
cally.
II. The Model
We consider a two-period model with two types of investor, a household
sector (H) which is risk averse and an institutional sector which comprises a
large number of tax-exempt institutions (I), such as pension funds, which are
risk-neutral. Households and institutions allocate fixed initial wealth among
twotypes of asset, corporate equity (E)andcorporate debt (D) .Ifwe denote





The total market value of security j is
v. =v+v j =D,E (2)
and total wealth is normalized to unity:
H I w +w =1 (3)
We shall assume that households and institutions are quite distinct and
we shall ignore any links between the two groups. The portfolio decisions of
households are made independently of the way any money which may have been3
invested by institutions on their behalf is invested by the managers of such
institutions. The reaction of the level of private household saving to changes
in institutional saving can be modeled by varying the relative levels of initial
wealth. We believe this to be a reasonable way to model the role of pension
funds. More debatable perhaps is the assumption that institutions are risk-
neutral, but it is useful in showing how the model behaves when households
are more risk-averse than institutions, and without it the model is much less
tractable. Relaxing the assumption would not alter the qualitative nature
of the results which we present below.
Wealth in this economy is held in the form of financial claims on the real
capital stock which is the sole input to production. We assume that there is
a single firm in the economy which we may think of as representing the corporate
sector. In the first period, the firm decides on the fraction of the value
of claims which will be sold in the form of debt and the fraction to be sold
as equity. In other words, it decides on the debt-equity ratio. It has no
decision to make about real variables. Given this decision, households and in-
vestors will allocate their wealth between the two securities. In the second
period, profits will be realized and will depend upon the state of the world.
We shall assume that there are only two possible states of the world. In the
first state, profits (before tax) are M1, and in the second, M2(M2 >
M1)
The probability of the favorable outcome, state 2, is agreed by all investors
to be p. For ease of notation we may let the rate of return on capital in state
o be described by 0. If the nominal interest rate on corporate debt is R then,
given the assumptions of limited liability and tax deductibility of interest
payments, the rate of return on equity is given by4





0 if 8< RvD (4)
where t is the corporate tax rate. Similarly, the rate of return on corporate
debt is:




where allowing for taxes, personal and corporate, and assuming zero bank-







=rateof personal tax on interest income
te =rateof personal tax on equity income, which may be thought of
as an average of the tax rates on dividends and capital gains;
hence, we assume tisstrictly less than t e p
In period one, investors allocate initial wealth among the two assets in
order to maximize the expected utility of second-period consumption. Since
institutions are risk-neutral they will maximize the expected value of (7) and,
hence, will allocate all their wealth to the asset with the higher expected
rate of return, except in the case where the expected rates of return are equal,
when they are indifferent. Households are assumed to maximize the expected
utility of a concave utility function defined on consumption as given by (6).
Both groups of investors will take the interest rate R and the debt-equity
vD
ratio l-) asgiven.5
In addition to the balance sheet constraints given by (1), we shall
place some non-negativity constraints on the value of security holdings. Since
institutions are risk-neutral, we need some constraints to rule out infinite
holdings and short sales, ans so we shall assume throughout that
v >0
j= D,£ (8)
It may or may not seem reasonable to rule out short sales of equity and debt
by households, and we shall discuss the implications of imposing such con-
straints later.
At this point, we should explain the relationship between our model and the
assumptions of the Modigliani -Millertheorem. We have assumed that all wealth
in the economy is invested in a single firm, and, thus, by definition the value
of the firm is always unity. In this trivial sense the value of the firm is in-
dependent of the debt-equity ratio. But, more fundamentally, we may ask
whether an investor's expected utility is a function of the debt-equity ratio.
In our model investors are indifferent to the choice of debt-equity ratioprovided
that there are no taxes and no binding non-negativity constraints on the levels
of security holding. This is true even though bankruptcymay occur. The reason
is that debt and equity provide two linearly independent assets whichspan
the consumption possibility set given by technology because we have only two
states of the world. If we were to add a third state of the world, the debt-
equity ratio would matter even in the absence of taxes and constraints.
For investors to engage in "homemade diversification", they must be able
to sell short either debt or equity as circumstances require. If we rule Out
short sales, the debt-equity ratio may matter and, of course, the introduction
of taxes means that investors have preferences over the choice of debt-equity6
ratio. As we shall see, it is likely that investors will disagree about the
optimal debt-equity ratio for the firm.
The system we have described contains seven unknowns, corresponding to
the four values of security holdings v, the total values of debt and equity,
and the coupon rate on corporate bonds. The first-order conditions for port-
folio optimization give two independent equations, and there are four accounting
constraints in (1) and (2) .Theremaining equation needed to close the sys-
tem describes the behavior of the firm. It has to determine the value of bonds
which it will sell which is equivalent to choosing the debt-equity ratio.
Although, one might argue that this will be chosen "in the interests of the
shareholders," such a criterion is ambiguous here because, in general, house-
holds and institutions will disagree as to what constitutes the "optimal" debt-
equity ratio. We shall discuss later the various criteria which might be used
to determine the value of the debt-equity ratio, but for the moment we shall
proceed on the assumption that it is given.
III. Types of Equilibria
At this stage we shall describe the types of equilibria which are feasible
and characterize them in terms of the relative holdings of the two assets by
the two types of investor. We shall then explore how changes in taxation and
uncertainty affect the outcomes. There are three types of "super-regime"
which are characterized by:






The last case is one in which so much debt is issued that the firm goes
bankrupt in each state of the world, and the return to equity is always zero.
Debt has effectively replaced equity as the sole security in the economy and
possesses the risk attributes of complete equity financing. Since interest
payments are deductible against the corporate income tax, such an outcome has
the attraction that no corporate tax is ever paid, and would appeal to
institutions which are exempt from personal but not corporate taxes. House-





If this inequality constraint is satisfied then in the absence of un-
certainty both households and institutions could choose a debt-equity ratio
sufficiently high to ensure that the profits of the firm were always distri-
buted in the form of payments to bondholders. We describe this case as one of
"pseudo-debt". This "super-regime" is degenerate in that it contains a single
equilibrium described by











Even if households prefer debt to equity for tax reasons, they may wish
to move away from all-debt financing in order to be able to diversify into
another security, namely equity. Only if the tax advantage from debt was
sufficiently large would they be happy to forego the benefits of diversification.
If condition (9) does not hold, then, considerations of both tax and portfolio
diversification would lead households to prefer an interior solution for the
debt-equity ratio. It is clear that households and institutions may disagree
over whether or not pseudo-debt is a desirable regime, and the outcome will
depend on which group has control of the firm. Each group will compare their
expected utility level under the regime of pseudo-debt with the maximum levels
attainable under the two other super-regimes. Expected utility of institution





We shall assume, henceforth, that households display constant relative
risk aversion and the degree of relative risk aversion is unity, which implies
that household utility may be written
H H H (12)
u (c )= logC




-p)logM1 +plog M2 (13)9
Further consideration of the probability of pseudo-debt occurring will
be postponed until we have characterized the other regimes.
IV. Risky Debt
A. Characterization
The intermediate "super-regime", that of risky debt is the major
subject of focus in this paper. It is in many ways the most interesting case,
and perhaps the most instructive about observed financial behavior. In this
regime, the firm goes bankrupt in the first state of the world, and the
returns to both debt and equity are risky. Because households are risk-averse,
they will generally diversify and will always hold at least some debt.4 Using
(4), (5), (6) and (12), we write the expected utility which households seek to
maximize as
H H M1 M-Rv







Throughuse of the accounting identities (1) and (2), the first-order condition













may be viewed as the household's absolute "tax preference" for equity
(see (9)).
Note that, given VD (15) is an expression of one unknown variable, the interest
rate R, in terms of another, the institutional holdings of bonds, v.
Unlike households, institutions are risky-neutral and will specialize in
which ever asset yields a higher expected return. They will hold only debt
if E(rD) >E(rE),only equity if E(rD) <E(rE),and diversify only if these
expected returns are equal. Using (3), (4) and (5) ,wemay summarize each of
these three "sub-regimes" of the risky-debt "super—regime" by one equation and
one inequality constraint in the unknown variables:




Regime 2: Institutions Specialize in Equity
V =0 (16.2)
R <R* (17.2)
Regime 3: Institutions Diversify
R =R* (16.3)










Under each regime, we have two equations, (15) and (16), in two unknown
variables, v and R, plus an inequality constraint, (17), in one of the two
unknown variables.
There exists an equilibrium in a particular regime for aspecific value
of VD if a solution to the relevant system of equations satisfies theinequality
constraint which applies. For an equilibrium with institutionsspecialized in
debt, the value of R obtained from (15) for v =1- mustexceed R*, which
is not a function of v;for one in which institutions holdonly .equity, setting
v =0and solving (15) for R must yield a value below R*; for anequilibrium
in which institutions hold both assets, there must exista value of v between
its extreme values at which (15) yields a value of Requal to R*.
B. Description of Equilibria
Aside from the relevant inequality constraint (17),any solution must be
one in which debt is risky; otherwise, the equations used to determine the
equilibrium are inapplicable. By the definition stated above, debt is risky




Thus, on a graph of R versusVD3 in Figure 1, the feasible region for
risky debt is the band between the two rectangular hyperbolasRvD =M1(labeled
m1 and RvD =M2(m2). We may subdivide this region into feasible regions for
each of the three risky-debt sub-regimes outlined above. DefiningR*(vD) from







1 —— +tR*/(ltv dv 2 c ciP
D VD
mustbe positive in the relevant range, and since R* =atVD =1,R*(vD)
can be represented by a curve such as the one labeled R* in Figure 1 and the
areas feasible for Regimes 1, 2, and 3 are labeled I, II, and II, respectively.
To determine equilibria, we must consider the household portfolio balance
condition (15). Define R(vD, v) by the value of R obtained from (15) for
specific values of VD and vD. For any value of VD it is only necessary to
define R over values of vD sufficiently large that (vD -v)exceeds (1 -
sothatboth numerator and denominator of the term in (15)arepositive.6
Let R'(vD) =R(VD,1 -w')and R2(vD) =R(vD,0) be the relevant functions for
Regimes1 and2, respectively. Any candidate(R, vD) for an equilibrium in
which institutions specialize in debt must reside in Sector I in Figure 1 and
satisfy R =R'(vD)
Similarly, if a point is to be an equilibrium with insti-
tutions holding just equity, (R, vD) must fall in Sector II and R must
equal R2(vD). An equilibrium of the third type must satisfy R* =R(vD,v)
for some intermediate value of v. The behavior of the function R will
determine the pattern of equilibria; the following collection of results is




(ii)R EM2 for VD =113
(iii) For any given v, over the relevant range ofvD, R is either strictly
increasing, strictly decreasing, or increasing and then decreasing.
In particular, if pT < 1, R1 is strictly increasing.
Part (i) of the proposition merely states that the interest rate must
increase to induce households to wish to hold more debt. In conjunction with the
second part, this says that R pivots up around the point (1, M2) in (vD, R)
space as v declines. Part (iii) says that the lowest of these curves, R, is
positively sloped throughout as long as pT < 1, a condition which is hard to
interpret but is likely to be satisfied unless the favorable outcome is almost
certain, since T is unlikely to be much greater then unity.
Now, consider the function Rm(vD) which chooses the median value from
among R'(vD), R2(vD) and R*(vD).7 This function traces out all risky debt
equilibria, as is now shown.
Proposition 2
(i) A pair (vD, R) is a risky-debt equilibrium if and only if condition
(19) issatisfied and R =
Rm(vD)
(ii)If pT < 1, the locus of such points isa continuous segment along
whichR is increasing with respect to VD.
proof:
(i)It is clear that any solution must satisfy (19) .Itremains to be
shown that if this condition is met, there exists a unique equilibrium,
given VD at R =Rm(vD).The proof is by cases.14
a. R*R1 < J. Equations (15) and(16.1) and inequality
constraint (17.1) are satisfied by v =1- and
"1 .... . "1 m R =R,sothat a "Regime 1" equilibrium exists at R =R=R
By Proposition 1, any other value of R exceeds R", so that
neither (16.2) and (17.2) nor (16.3) and (17.3) can hold
simultaneously.
b. R1 < R2 _R*. It follows in an analogous manner that there exists
2 in a unique equilibrium of R =R=R
c. R1 < R* < R2. It is evident that neither (16.1) and (17.1) nor
(16.2) and (17.2) can hold simultaneously, so that the only
candidate for equilibrium is Regime 3. Since R is continuous
RR* for some value ofVD between 0 and (1 -wH),so that
(16.3) and (17.3) are satisfied and R =R*=Rm.
Since these cases are exhausted, the proof of part (1) is complete.
(ii) Since R*, R1 and R2 are all continuous, so is Rm. What we must rule
Out is that R passes Out of and then back into the region defined
by condition (19). We can certainly do so once we show that Rm
increases monotonically with respect to
VD.
Since > 0 and, for pT > 1, > 0 ,Rmwill also be increasing
VD
with respect to zero unless Rm =R2at a point where —< 0. But
this can't happen. Were this so, then, by Proposition 1 2 would15
continue to decline until equalling M2 at v =1.Since > 0
I)
VD
and R* also equals M2 at VD =1,this would imply that
R* < R2 at the current VD, implying that RmR2. Thus, Rm can
2
equal R only if, at that point, > 0, which ensures the monotonicty
VD m
of R
Typical representations of and R2 are shown in Figure 2, along with
the curves m1, m2 and R*. The equilibria along Rm are shaded.
Two additional comments are in order about the shapes of these curves.
First, although we shall, henceforth, assume it to be satisfied, the condition
that pT < 1, although not very constraining, is not very crucial, either. If
pT were greater than one, this would merely cause the equilibrium curve Rm
to peak at a value of VD < 1. The only complication that could occur might be
that for pT implausibly large, P.m might intersectm1 in more than one place.
The second point concerns the shapes of the curvesR1, R2 and R*. As we have
drawn them in Figure 2, R1 and R2 intersect R* in at most one place other
than at VD =l;wereR1 andR2 concave downward, and R*concave upward, we
could prove that each of R and R could intersect R* at most once, and that
at such intersections R* would be the flatter of the two curves. We are not
quite able to do this; however, numerous empirical simulations indicate that the
curves will behave in this way for any conceivable parameter values, and that the
regimes of equilibria occur in the order shown in Figur- 2. To be more specific,
suppose v is the value of vD at which Rm intersects m1. Then there will exist
values v and v, such that v < v < v < 1 and, for each value ofVD between
v and 1, there will be a risky-debt equilibrium in which institutions
(i) specialize in equity if v < VD < v16
(ii) diversify if v <VD < v
(iii) specialize in debt if v <
VD
<1
This result is in accordance with intuition and we shall assume it to be
valid in the following discussion. When debt is not very risky, institutions
hold none or little of it, even given their relative tax preference for it,
because they can obtain a higher return on the risky equity which households
do not wish to hold. As the leverage of the firm increases, debt gets
riskier, and households are less willing to hold it. This drives down the
return on equity relative to debt, and institutions shift into debt. What is
somewhat surprising is that, through all of the ownership shifts occurring as
vD rises, the interest rate R is a stable, monotonic function of vD.
C. Effects of Changes in Risk or Tax Rates
The equilibrium framework we have presented in this section lends itself
quite naturally to the study of the effects of parameter changes on the system.
By assessing the impact of these changes on the functions R1, R2 and R*,
we may depict these effects graphically. We consider first the effects of
changing the corporate tax rate, t, the household tax on interest, t,
and the household tax on equity, t. In all cases, we consider an uncompensated
change in the tax.8
(i) Tax Rate Changes
The effects of changes in t, te and t on R' and R2 are found by dif-
ferentiating R with respect to the particular tax rate, for v =1-
andv =0,respectively. Since the numerator and: denominator of (15) are
both positive at equilibrium values (see footnote 6), it is clear that17
I .. H >0for all values of vD. specifically 0 and (1 -w).Thus,any
increase in T shifts R' and R2 upward; such an increase will occur if
t increases or t or t decreases. R* is not a function of either t
p c e e
or t .Thus,an increase in t ,ora decrease in t will have the
p p e
effect shown in Figure 3a. The rate of interest at each point will
either increase or remain constant, the range of values of
over which institutions specialize in debt (Regime 1) increases, and
the range of values ofvD over which institutions specialize in
equity declines. To summarize these results, a tax change which
increases the household's tax preference for equity without affecting
that of institutions (which depends only on tc) will increase the
likelihood that institutions hold only debt or at least some debt and
will increase the coupon rate in some cases, having no effect in
others.
This shift of institutions toward debt need not occur from a change
in tc, since the tax preference of institutions, as well as that of house-
holds, is affected. As shown in the preceding paragraph, a rise in T,
which could result from a decrease in the corporate tax rate, raises
R1 and R2.Howver, we can see from (18) that R* also depends on
dR* t.Asimple calculation shows that —<0,so that a decline in t c
dtc c
also raises R*. Thus, the effect of a decrease in tc,shown in Figure
3b,is certain to raise R at any given VDI but the effect on regime is
uncertain.18
(ii)Changesin Risk
We must first define what we mean by "risk". We choose to con-
sider an increase in risk to be any change in the parameters M1,











-p)(p - M1) (21)
Thus, an increase in variance with mean constant can occur from an
increase in M2, a decrease in M1, or both. We consider each of these
cases.
(a) M1 decreases, M2 fixed ("Catastrophe Risk")
From (20), it is clear that a 'decrease in M1 with mean
constant and M2 fixed implies an increase in p. The chance of
the bad state occurring is lower but its outcome is more
ruinous. We wish to calculate the changes in R1, R2 andR*.
R is not a function M1 directly, but does depend on p.





whereD is the denominator in (15).19
I .. . SinceVD -VD
>0, is positive and, since is
- 131
positive, .> 0.Thus, curves R' and R2 both shift up.






so that this change in M1 and p holding p constant clearly in-
creases R*.
Thus, all three curves shift up. Like a decrease in the
corporate tax rate, an increase in "catastrophe risk" increases
the rate of interest for all risky-debt equilibria, but has
an uncertain impact of the determination of regime. Unlike
the previous case, the increase in R occurs because the
expected return to debt, given R, decreases as decreases,
due to limited liability.
(b) M1 decreases, M2 increases ("dispersion risk")
For simplicity, we consider relative changes in and
which keep p constant.
It is clear that such an increase in risk increases R,
since R depends positively on arid is independent of M1.
From (23), it also follows, that an increase in M2 with p and
p fixed increases R*. Thus, as in the previous case, all
three curves shift up, raising the interest rate at all
risky-debt equilibria but having an uncertain effect on
regime.20
(c) M1 fixed, M2 increases ("Sweepstakes risk")
Such an increase in risk must, for constant, be
accompanied by a decrease in p. Thus, we may think of this
increase in risk as a combination of an increase in and
a decrease in M1 with an increase in of equal size and a
decrease in p -anincrease in "dispersion risk" coupled with
a decrease in "catastrophe risk". Since these two types
of risk have similar effects on R1, R2 and Rm, this combina-
tion might be expected to have an uncertain total impact.
Indeed, this hypothesis is borne out by an examination of the
relevant derivatives, which indicate that the effects on R1,
R2 and R* are all uncertain.
The key to understanding why an increase in this type of
risk has a different effect on equilibrium values of R lies
in the fact that declines in cases (a) and (b) ,butnot
here. For R constant, a decrease in diminishes the actual
return to debt in the bad state, Ml/vD ,buthas no effect on
that in the good state. Thus, the expected return to holding
debt decreases, and R must increase to compensate for this.
This is not a risk premium, but merely an increased difference
between the coupon rate and the actual expected return to hold-
ing debt. Since does not decline with an increase in
"sweepstakes risk", no such effect is present.21
D. A Note on Household Non-Negativity Constraints
As already shown above, any condition constraining households from
engaging in short sales of debt will never be binding when debt is risky.
The remaining issue concerns potential short sales of equity. Such a con-
straint would be binding if, at an equilibrium, total equity,yE. were
less than that held by institutions, or, using the accounting identities,
H I W <DD (24)
It is evident from (24) that the possibility of household short sales
diminishes as the fraction of wealth held by household increases. Neverthe-
less, it might appear that for large values ofVD near one, such sales would
be inevitable. But here the pattern of equilibria described above becomes
relevant. Since institutions go from holding equity to holding debt as
VD
increases, the right-hand side of (24) rises less rapidly thanvD rises.
Thus, short sales need not occur at all, and the constraint may become
superfluous.
Although our model could be adapted to account for a constraint on
household short sales of equity, our simulations indicate that short sales
are unlikely to arise even without a constraint and, hence, we do not attempt
such an exercise.
V. Riskless Debt
The final regime we consider is that in which there is insufficient debt
issued for bankruptcy to be possible; debt's rate of return is certain and














from which a couple of things may be observed. If the after-tax expected re-
turns to equity and debt are equal, households will choose to hold only debt,
an outcome one would certainly expect in a model such as this. This may be
seen by noting that in such a case, the first term on the right-hand side of
HH
(25) is zero, andthesecond has the same sign as (C2 -C1)
.Since
H H H H HHH H.
C2 >C1
when vD <wand C2 <
C1
when VD >w,itfollows that expected utility
is maximized when v =Hand v =0.
Since t >ta case in which households have the same expected return on
debt and equity would correspond to one in which institutions would receive a
higher return on debt. No one would hold equity, and this possibility can be
dismissed since VD <1.Thus, the expected return on equity E(r) must exceed
(1 -t)R/(l
-t).
Beyond this, there are few limiations on the pattern of portfolio
holdings. It is possible to envision situations in which institutions
specialize in debt, equity or are diversified while households are either
diversified or hold only equity. The outcome will depend, in general, on
two factors. First, the greater is the inherent risk of the firm, the more
reluctant households will be to move into equity as its rate of return rises.23
In a situation with the firm very risky, therefore, we wouldexpect to see
households diversified, with institutions absorbing increases or decreases in
the supply of securities. At the other extreme, were
M2M1, households
would shift their entire portfolio into equity as soon as the return to
equity rose slightly above (1 -t)R/(l
-te)but before it rose to R,
leaving institutions specialized in debt. This behavior corresponds to
that occurring in the absence of risk, not surprisingly. The second factor
influencing the pattern of holdings is the distribution of wealth between
households and institutions. Here, the fairly obvious point is that if
institutions hold only a small fraction of the wealth, it is unlikely we
will observe an equilibrium in which households specialize in equity, for
someone must hold the existing debt.
Unfortunately, we are unable to produce for this regime the kind of
simple analytical results obtained in the previous case without imposing
more restrictive assuiriptions.
VI. Simulation Results
To illustrate the results developed above for the cases of risky debt and
"pseudo-debt", we present two simulations of our model. In the first simu-
lation, we take the probability of success, p, to be .75, and the returns to
the firm in the two states, M1 and M2, to be 1 and 6, respectively. Household
wealth is set at .75. We set the corporate tax,t, equal to .4, and
initially set the rates of personal taxation,t and te equal to .4 and
0, respectively. The results, listed in Table 1, show the security holdings
of households and institutions, the expected returns to equity and debt, the
expected utility of households, and the coupon rate on bonds.24
The resulting equilibria follow the pattern shown in Figure 2. Debt
is risky as long as VD >.33,with institutions holding only equity for
VD <.36,diversified for .36 <VD .66, and holding only debt for all higher
values of VD. Households are diversified throughout, and hold the majority
of their wealth in equity for values of VD below .44.
The results concerning the expected returns on securities and expected
utility of households are quite interesting. While the expected return
on debt increases steadily as debt gets riskier, the expected return on
equity does not, increasing with VD to the point at which institutions shift
entirely out of equity, and decreasing thereafter. Household expected
utility is not only nonmonotonic, but it has multiple peaks, one at the
point where institutions shift out of equity, and the global maximum at the
point where debt is least risky.
These results highlight an important issue alluded to in the introduction.
Because of different attitudes toward risk and different tax schedules, house-
holds and institutions may differ as to what the "optimal" debt-equity ratio
is. In this example, restricted to the case where debt is not perfectly
safe, households would prefer the smallest leverage possible, while institu-
tions would prefer the greatest -"pseudo-debt".Since households are always
the majority stockholders, they can dictate the choice of VD• However, one
could imagine a situation arising in which each group's "optimal" debt-
equity ratio occurred at a point at which the other was in control of the firm.
Insuch a situation, the choice of a debt-equity ratio "in the interests of
the stockholders" would be difficult indeed25
The second simulation illustrates another issue raised in the introduction.
Here we increase both personal income taxes, settingt =.549and te =.25,
leaving all other parameters the same as in the first simulation. The results
are shown in Table 2. An important point which we wish to illustrate here is
that even though both institutions and households have a tax preference for
debt (T =.998)they do not agree that a "pseudo-debt" equilibrium is optimal.
The gains from diversification made available as more equity is issued
outweigh any tax disadvantages that households suffer. In fact, households
again prefer the debt-equity ratio at which debt is least risky. As concerns
the incidence of these tax increases, household utility is reduced to less than
half of its original level at all values ofVD as a result of the increases in
personal income tax rates. However, there is only a minor effect on the rate of
return earned by institutions. In fact, at the debt-equity ratio which would
be optimal from the households' viewpoint,VD =.33,the expected return of
institutions, who hold only equity, actually increases.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a very simple general equilibrium model
of the portfolio behavior of households and institutions, paying particular
attention to the influence of differences in tax rates and attitudes toward
risk. Despite the restrictive nature of our model, it yields very complex
results, only some of which have been explored in the foregoing analysis.
A number of extensions might be suggested. First, greater attention should
be given to determining the pattern of holdings which arises when debt is
riskless. Second, an important policy issue is the general equilibrium effect
of tax changes on the welfare of different individuals. While we have
examined the influence of separate, uncompensated tax changes on the model's26
outcome, our results concerning incidence, though interesting, must be
considered merely illustrative. What is needed is the imposition of a govern-
ment budget constraint, through which the effect of shifting the burden
of assessment among different taxes could be evaluated.
Another issue we have not adequately addressed here is the determination
of a firm's debt-equity ratio. As was illustrated in the numerical simulations,
different classes of shareholders may consider radically different debt-equity
ratios to be "optimal";a majority voting rule need not result in a stable
equilibrium, for the distribution of share ownership itself depends on the
financial policy chosen by the firm.
A few words are also in order concerning the importance of some of our
more restrictive assumptions. We have ruled out the existence of a safe
asset unconnected with the firm, such as government bonds. If there were
such an asset, there would then be three assets in the model. Since there
are only two states of the world, only two of these assets are necessary to
span the opportunity set and no investor will, in general, hold all three
assets; we cannot tell which of the three an investor will hold, but two
will be adequate. Consequently, we would lose the diversification of port-
folios. This would be restored in moving to a model with three states of
the world, with households holding all three assets, but such a model would
be considerably more complex without affording a new dimension of insight.
Replacing our one-firm model with one having several small firms would
also cause a proliferation of securities, and each investor could specialize
in the appropriate investment for tax purposes. Firms would specialize in
stockholders,and we would once again lose diversification, which would
reappear if the number of states of the world exceeded the number of firms.
It is this phenomenon we wish to model.Finally, we recognize that the assuiription that institutions are risk-
neutral is not entirely appropriate. If instjtutions were mildly risk-
averse, it is hard to see how the qualitative nature of the results would




In this section, we present demonstrations of the various results listed
in Proposition 1 in the paper. For convenience, we restate each claim before
giving its proof.
(1) <0for VD< 1
vD
























(iii)For any given v, over the relevant range of VD,Ris either strictly
increasing, strictly decreasing, or increasing and then decreasing.
In particular, if pT <1, is strictly increasing.














into this expression the expressions for N and D, and rearranging terms, we
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which is negative. Thus, ,and,hence, willbe always positive,
D
always negative, or positive for VD smaller than some value and negative
above it. This proves the first part of the above assertion. Toprove the
"l
second part, we need only prove that >0at VD =1,since it must then
D
be positive for smaller values ofvD. Evaluating at VD =1yields
D
= 2 -(T-1) -v)
+(1-p)wH]
DvD=l
which is positive if and only if





which, for vD =1-w,reducesto the condition
pT <130
Footnotes
1) Two examples of this type of result, arising from somewhat different
theoretical assumptions, may be found in Miller (1977) and Auerbach
(1979)
2) See Sharpe (1964) or Lintner (1965) for a treatment of this approach.
3) This condition is derived in King (1977), chapter 4.
4) This last result follows from the fact that equity has a zero return in
state 1 and utility is logarithmic.
5) This assumes either that there are no short sale restrictions on households
or that such restrictions as may exist are not binding at the optimum. It
is clear from the previous footnote that the only restriction which might
be relevant is one prohibiting short sales of equity. We shall return
to this issue once this regime has been more fully explored.
6) No lower value of VD could be sustained as a risky—debt equilibrium. Since
households always demand some debt v =vD
-v
>0.It follows that if
the numerator in (15) were negative, either the denominator would be
positive and R <0,or else the denominator would be negative and RvD >M2;
in either case, an equilibrium could not occur.
7) If one of these three values is not defined, choose the lower value of the
two which are. It will never be necessary to define RTh in situations
where more than one of Rm, 1 and 2 are not defined.
8) It would be useful to know the compensated effects of such changes, as
well. However, this would be considerably more difficult to ascertain
analytically and will not be attempted in this paper.
9) Since the returns M1 and M2 are certainly not normally distributed, the
variance alone is not a perfect measure of "risk". Such a measure would
need to take account of higher moments of the distribution of returns as
well, but in a complicated way.31
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